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CHAPTER TWO
The pursuit ofthe subject: literature as critic
and peifecter ofphilosophy I79 0 - I83 0
Nicholas Saul
In 1798 the Romantic writer Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) boldly re-
duced the age in which he lived to three dominant tendencies.' That
the French Revolution, the most significant single political and cultural
development in modernity, should be written large no one then or now
would dispute. Alongside this historical cataclysm, however, Schlegel
ranks phenomena from the republic of letters: a philosophy, Johann
Gottlieb Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre' (theory of knowledge); and a liter-
ary work, the novel Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795-6; I-1lilhelm Meister's
)/ears qfapprenticeship) byJohann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832). Schlegel's
intention, ofcourse, is to emphasise and provoke. But he clearly intends a
fundamental relation between the Revolution, philosophy and literature
in our epoch. Ofwhat kind? The age around 1800, it will be argued with
Schlegel, was one in which literature and philosophy self-consciously
co-operated and competed for Germany's intellectual leadership. The
Revolution ultimately determined their relationship. Both literature and
philosophy sought words to eA-press its meaning. Both hoped to launch
actions out of those words.
The Revolution then as now was in fact seen philosophically - as
the fulfilment of the project of Enlightenment, which Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804) had famously defined as the emergence ofhumanity from its
self-imposed tutelage, that is, as a race of fully self-conscious free beings.
Concretely, as Kant said, Enlightenment meant rampant criticism - of
all received forms ofthought and action - by the new authority in matters
of truth: human reason (KrV, 13n). The public sphere, in which matters
ofdispute might be settled not by appeal to received authority (religion,
the state, tradition) but according to agreed, transparent rules ofrational
debate, had for the first time in Germany begun to constitute itself in the
life of the middle classes; in the form of literary and philosophical jour-
nals, reading clubs and the like. Here, and not just in the universities, the
thinking of knowledge, morality, art, politics and above all religion was
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cast for the first time in recognisably modern form. With its replacement
of the traditional form of the state by a representative constitution and
a republic and of Christian religion by the official cult of the supreme
being qua reason, the Revolution in France (ifnot in Germany) seemed to
mark the u-anslation of Enlightenment theory into practice. It seemed to
fulfiJ the long-cherished project of the French philosophes, to embody the
final, anthropocentric re-ordering ofhuman alTairs. The full significance
of thi - perhap because of the widespread Burkean rejection of polit-
ical violence - was only beginning to be grasped in Germany. All this
Schlegel encapsulates in his dictum. But where did Ficl1le and Goethe,
philosophy and literature, seek to lead the tendencies of the Revolution?
To share their common yet divergent vision, only himed at in Schlegel's
lapidary commentary, we must first turn to the unnamed authority on
whose monumental achievement their work rests, and through whom
the significance of the Revolution was mediated to Germany: Kant.
Kant had not only included the term 'critical' in his philo ophy's title,
suggesting that it drew the sum of Enlightenment philo ophical endeav-
our, but also characterised his system metaphorically (and \\~th calculated
political implication) as a Copernican revolutionary shift in philosoph-
ical thought (KrV, 23, 25, 28). His philo ophy is revolutionary in that he
ground three major fields of philosophical endeavour - epistemology,
ethics and aesthetics - in a radically new way which provides the intellec-
tual signature of the epoch around J800 and of modernity: in subjectivity.3
But for his successors Kant's account of subjectivity - despite its axial
function in the system - raised as many problems as it solved. Fichte and
Goethe reprcsent the main philosophical and literary tendencies of the
age not only because tlley take up the pursuit of the subject as the key
to humanity' self-understanding in our epoch of Revolution, but also
because they see philosophical and aesthetic discourse, with their distinc-
tively differing mode of talk, as competing for the prize. This chapter
chans the progres ofthat chase - as a dialogue between the epoch's great
philosophical movement, the idealism of Kant, Fichte and Schelling,
and its literary counterpans, the classicism and Romanticism of Goethe,
Schiller, Schlegel, Hardenberg- ovalis and others. At the end of
that dialogue stands the system of perhaps the ultimate philosopher
of subjectivity, Hegel.
The problem of subjectivity arises for Kant because of his dissatisfac-
tion with traditional metaphysics, which he thought relied on excessively
self-confident use ofdeductive rationality. He therefore submitted reason
itself to criticism and the subject to unprecedented logical dissection. In
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order to guarantee the scientific status of knowledge claims (including
metaphysical ones), an alternative, more reliable epistemological model
was required. In the Kritik der reinen Vernw!fl (1780, 1787; Cn'tique r!fpure
reasoll) the e""perirnental procedures of truth finding in mathematics and
natural science seemed to ofTer just that, and so to reveal the condi-
tions under which propositions might claim necessarily to be true. The
geometrician Thales had for example understood that all certain know-
ledge of the triangle's properties derived paradoxically not [rom empir-
ical (a posteriori) investigation of the thing, but from the concepts he
himsclf had already formulated independently of experience (a priori);
indeed, triangles not being given in nature, he had to refer to a priori
concepts to construct the thing in the first place (KrV, 22). Galileo knew
empirical observation to be indispensable in natural science. But he also
knew that observation can only be adequately judged by principles of
enquiry grounded in reason. Reason in natural science is to this extent
counter-intuitive: not the pupil, but the judge of nature. Reason dictates
theoretical questions for nature to answer, secure in the knowledge that,
as in geometry, reason can only grasp that which reason itself has al-
ready projected (23() - even if only nature can answer the questions.
Before any metaphysical enquiry can begin, then, tlle task of the Kritik
der reintm Vernu'!fi is to e""plain the conditions under which a priori cogni-
tion, Witll its characteristic certainty, general validity and independence
of experience, is possible: how the laws of nature are founded not in
nature, but in the structure of human reason, not in the object, but in
the sul!fect.
Obviously, the key to transcendental philosophy lies in tlle functions
attributed to the thinking subject, but precisely here problems arise. The
first task is to clarifY the relation of the a priori and the empirical in the
constitution of experience, which Kant briskly defines as having cogni-
tive cllaracter. He sees only two sources of knowledge: sensuality and
conceptuality. Sensuality gives us objects to experience, conceptuality
th.inks them. But sensuality, ifwe try to consider it free of imerference by
concepts, only gives us objects in a certain way, as material sensations.
Abstracting from material sensuality in order to arrive at its transcen-
dental condition (a priori principle), we arrive at the notion of a pure
(irreducible) form of sensuality, pure intuition. Time and space are the
two pure forms of intuition; tlley ofTer the subject two channels of in-
tuitive experience, inner and outer, self and world. But experience so
constituted concerns things only as they appear, not in themselves. This
exploration ofa priori conditions relates only to the possibility of things'
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reception, not their intrinsic possibility: a rose's redness appears different
to different subjects, is not a feature of the rose in itse[( Kant thus obtains
conditions ofthe possible reality and objectivity ofexperience at the level
of sensuality at the price of a fundamental dualism: the supposition ofa
stratum of cognitivcly inaccessible ideality.
Problems also arise with the understanding. Here cognition functions
not intuitively but discursively, through concepts. If intuition is funda-
mentally receptive, understanding is fundamentally spontaneous. But
if intuition gives us material sensation immediately, understanding op-
erates only through mediation, in unifying judgements which subsume
particular, indefinite, multifarious inputs under general concepts accord-
ing to deep-structural logical rules in the understanding, categories. 'ow
judgement can only function if sensual inputs (which would otherwise
be chaotic) are synthesised a priori into a singular order of representa-
tions, on which the understanding does its work. Thi pre-cognitive task
is performed by the imagination. Only application of the categories, as a
priori concepts of the understanding, can con titute intuitions as know-
ledge. But categories achieve this only in so far as an intuition actually
does correspond to the concept. Anything can be ilzoughl, but it does not
thereby automatically attain cognitive value. Concepts without intuitions
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind (Kr V g8). Experience,
then, or knowledge, is only possible in that field of representation consti-
tuted by the imagination (transcendental synthesis of apperception), and
in which judgements are formed by the action of concepts on intuitions,
a proces of intel{acing which Kant terms the schematism. This is also
where the subject, considered as consciousness, resides. There must be
orne stable in tance which acts spontaneously upon the manifold repre-
sentations in the synthesis ofapperception. An 'I think', a primal or pure
apperception (to distinguish it from empirical input), the transcendental
unity of self-consciousness, accompanies all work of cognition (136fI).
This is what acts through time, the inner ense, in the process of mak-
ingjudgements. The difficulty is that Kant's critical project, which rests
on accountability to reason and which proudly proclaims the defining
role ofsubjectiv;ty in the constitution of knowledge, at this crucial POinl
avoids accountability. For when we ask for an explanation of the '1 think'
(self-knowledge), we receive an answer analogous to that for questions in
respect of things in themselves. Beyond knowledge 111111 1am (as appear-
ance), says Kant, we cannot go. My intelligence may frame a concept of
self But the intuition of self which alone would satisfY the condition of
cognition (IS2f) is impossible, since intelligence cannot by definition be
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intuited and in any case manifests itself only as conditioned by the inner
form of time, which is beyond conceptuality.4
It should by now be clear why Schlegel, searching for modernity's
representative philosopher, did not select Kant. Kant's project, despite
his radicality and systematic approach, still seemed incomplete. By 1794
Kantian transcendental philosophy had already been subjected to several
critical analyses, most notably by Friedrich HeinrichJacobi (1743-1819).
Jacobi argued in Humean style that our cognitions of things are in fact
mere mental representations, which relate to things in themselves in a
way not inteUigible to us.; This sceptical-fideistic line found its ultimate
expression in Jacobi's suggestion that in a transcendental enquiry any
chain of conditions ultimately ends in the unconditioned: ince this can-
not be made an object ofcognition, all cognition rests at last on something
beyond reason, a salto mOrl<1le ofintuitional conviction, or faith 6 But it was
Fichte (/759-1814), fixing on Kant's central yet highly tentative account
of subjectivity, who offered a far more radical account of subjectivity
and cognition. The 'Wissenschaftslehre' was intended to complete the
critique of pure reason. 7 However in one of its most accessible formula-
tions, the <wate Eur!£itUllg in die Wisscnscluiftslehre (1797; Second introduction
to the theo')/ qflalOwledge),8 Fichte holds against Kant that there is an intel-
lectual intuition (459). He agrees that such a thing cannot be formulated
conceplually and demonstrated in a proof through propositions, still
less can its meaning be communicated. But it can be experienced, and
Fichte's work in this context is full less of argument than of exhortations
to the reader to foUow his instructions and reproduce the e;>,:perience in
themselves. The e},,1>erience is of primal self-consciousness (Kant's pure
apperception) as sheer activity (463), the activit)' of those who as it were
looking inward try merely to think themselves. This, says Fichte, is an
immediate, spontaneous consciousness IMI the subject is active and whal
that activity is. As such, despite its pre-reflexive status, it is characterised
by unquestionable necessity. It is the sole fixed reference point of aU phi-
losophy (466). On the basis ofthis ultra-Cartesian account ofinteUectual
intuition Fichte moves to the conceptual level, and deduces the condi-
tions of the possibility of self-consciousness implied by his notion of the
subject as pure activity. \oVhat we caU self-consciousness is in fact an em-
pirical structure of reflection, the mere result of something prior9 The
empirical subject ('lch') initiaUy (as it were) thinks itself. Yet this subject
is limited in reflection by something not itself, the object ('Nicht-Ich').
It being impossible in reflection to transcend the reciprocal determina-
tions of the series (thinking the thinking of thinking, and so on ad ilifinitum)
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except in intellectual intuition, the philosopher concludes speculatively
that the reciprocal subject-object structure ofempirical self-conciousness
must be the result of the activity of a postulated absolute subject which
contains all reality and which consists in free self-positing, a kind of un-
limited emanation ofsheer activity ('productive imagination', 215). This
so far hardly accounts for empirical reality, the facts of our limited con-
sciousness. But fichte further deduces that the absolute subject must itself
freely limit - negate - the potentially infmite centrifugal Aow of activity.
This generates an equal and opposite centripetal dynamic. The facts of
empirical consciousness, then, emerge from something like an a priori
narrative. They are the result of a primal ctivision and alienation from
the unified, absolute, and free source of being. Empirical experience,
in which the subject feels alternately free and yet determined by the
object, is dle relatively stable result of this infmite-finite interaction. In
practical terms, dle thing in itself('Not-I') has been explained away; the
relative autonomy of things is accounted for by the limiting activity of
the absolute subject necessary to constitute empirical reality. The subject
too is accounted for, as the pure freedom ofspontaneous activity (which
admittedly is only experienced in imelleetual intuition). Practical and
theoretical domains of philosophy, systematically separated in Kant, are
joined at the root, and the ethical task of the subject is to overcome the
scission between empirical and absolute freedom made concrete by the
resistance of the 'Not-I'. Unsurprisingly, this absolute subjectivism, \\~th
its celebration of unconctitional freedom as the very essence, origin and
end of the human person in the world of contingent necessity, seemed
to fichte and (for a time) Schlegel to have devcloped philosophy in the
revolutionary age to an ultimate point. Goethe's classicist friend and col-
laborator Friedrich Schiller (1759-18°5) called it subjective Spinozism.
Schlegel's Romantic friend and collaborator Friedrich von Hardenberg
(Novalis; 1772-1801), who like Schlegel recognised the spirit of dle age
in a philosophical system, nominated fichte for membership of a fan-
ciful Direcloire of philosophy in Germany as guarctian of the constitution
(NS II, 529[).
If Fichte's philosophy seemed authentically to represent the revolu-
tional)' realisation of subjective freedom in theoretical and practical
spheres, Goethe's WilJ1£lm Meisiers Lehrjahre was that work of contem-
porary literature which dealt most fully with another, correlated ctimen-
sion of subjective development: self-cultivation. In this, the Bildwzgsromoll
which established the generic paractigm, a representative young 'Burger'
(middle-class man) struggles to become himself: 'to cultivate myself, just
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as I am, that from youth on was dimly my wish and my intention"o
Bildullg, the means to thaI sovereignty of self which Meister's name im-
plies, connotes a good deal more than cultivation of the intellect. That,
in a sense, is precisely what \'\'ilhelm protests against. The 'Burger' were
politically disenfranchised in rationalistic but sOU-feudal Germany, their
role in the state defined by management and wealth-production. One
of the foils to Wilhelm, his brother-in-law Werner, thinks double-entIJ,
book-keeping is one of the most beautiful inventions of the human spirit.
'ATilhelm wants to transcend this impoverished vision, which circum-
scribes human fulfilment with the work-ethic and abstract c1everne .
But in this he asks something his society cannot yet provide to a man of
his provenance: cultivation in the most comprehensive sense, ofhis indi-
vidual person - not only intellecl, but the senses, emotions, imagination,
physicality, sociability-ofwhatever potentialities nature has bestowed on
him, so that he may become fully human, a whole person. There seem to
\'\'ilhelm to be only two avenues through contemporary German society
to this goal: that of the leisured aristocracy. with its privileged, essentially
Baroque ideal of personal cultivation, and that of the diclnsse world of
the theatre. Both exploit the potential of aesthetic experience to bypass
the equation of cia s, work and per onal limitation. Having taken the
only path open to him, into the Bohemian theatre world where art and
work seem one, Wilhelm is disappointed. Self-realisation on the stage
proves to be a mere veneer covering the familiar exigencies of the world
of profil and loss. Yel he does not renounce the potential for personal
growth disclosed by the experience of art. He learns to imernalise the
lessons ofart (as a kind of nobility of soul) and to practise a kind of free
utopian renunciation of unlimited self-development, recognising his in-
trinsic limitation at one level, but overcoming it at another, and working
elftessly in a mutually complementary collective of similarly dispo ed,
mainly aristocratic individuals al projects intended to improve human-
ity's practical lot - a typical German reaction to the Revolution, rejecting
its means, retaining its aims.
This is admittedly a muted kind ofsovereignty ofself. Yet what makes
the novel for Schlegel into another embodiment of the fundamental
tendencies of the revolutionary age is not the rather severe (probably
Kantian) ethic Wilhelm arrives aI, but the sense in which not philo ophy
but aesthetic experience exertS a tran formative, emancipatory power over
the self in the world of empirical contingency and limitation. After the
theatre episode, Meister reads a spiritual autobiography, the story of a
'schone Seele' (beautiful soul). Following a spiritual crisis, moral action
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has become second nature for the beautiful soul, to such a degree that her
ethical perfection translates into an aesthetic quality: she seems positively
to incorporate ethical grace in real life (rather than, for example, on
stage). From this reading WIlhelm emerges a changed man, ripe for
admission to the collective of utopian renouncers. Aesthetic experience,
then, may (as in the theatre) lead to a loss of the sense of reality. Rightly
understood, however, it is also something without which WIlhelm would
not have attained the position he does. This is why, having abandoned
the theatre, he comes into his aesthetic inheritance (an art collection)
at the close of the novel. An may not be an end in itself; that way
existential disaster lies. But used properly, art can make us into what
we ought to be. Fichte's philosophy self-reflectively seemed to draw the
sum of all philosophy. Goethe's novel seemed like a work of art which
self-reflectively drew the sum ofall art - and in some way complemented
Fichte. This, evidently, is why Schlegel ranked Wilhelm Meisl£rs Ldzrjahre
alongside Fichte and the French Revolution.
But why does Wilhelm never consider philosophy as a means to self-
cultivation, when at the end of the philosophical century it had just
attained such authoritative stature in the works ofKant and Fichte? And
in what way might literature, as Schlegel implies, complement the work
of philosophy? To grasp this is to understand why literature and philos-
ophy co-operated and competed around 1800. Goethe for his part had
constructed the project of BilJung - aesthetic humanism" - exemplified
by Wilhelm Meisl£rs Lehrjahre on the foundation of Schiller's mature aes-
thetics. There was little dispute between the classical duo. But Schiller's
aesthetics are the result ofa difference with Kant over the means to realise
the moral destiny of the human race at this critical, post-revolutionary
juncture in its historical development. Schiller was a declared Kantian,
who had above all been impressed by the ethics of the critical philosophy,
and in many ways his mature aesthetics (and literary writings) can be
seen as an attempt to popularise Kantian morality. Bildung or aesthetic
education nonetheless emerges from a momentous dispute with the sage
of Konigsberg.
In two complementary works, the Grundkgung zur Metaphysik dcr Si/./en
(1785; Founda/.ion qf /.he metaph),sUs qf morals) and the Kri/.ik tier praktischen
VcrnUlifl (1787; Cri/.ique qfpractical reason)," Kant, the destroyer of tradi-
tional metaphysics, had nevertheless preserved the trace of metaphysics
in his rigoristic ethics. No principle derived from empirical experience,
he insists, can suffice for pure practical reason to ground moral ac-
tion. However abstractly formulated, such principles are bound to be
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heteronomous: contaminated by personal interest in some outcome
(Grundlegung, 34, 39(). The moral principle which determines the will
must be a priori, totally unconditioned and autonomous, purely formal,
grounded compellingly in the structure of reason itself. This is the cate-
gorical imperative (45). In reality, the will must ofcourse act to some end
and treat others correspondingly. But since humanity - seen as a rational
creature - is an end in itse!f(s9ff.), the transcendental principle of prac-
tical reason is easily formulated: act in such a way that all persons are
treated as ends in themselves. Now from speculative reason's standpoint
our autonomy as the principle of ethical causality is a mere idea. It is
well founded in reason, but no intuition from the realm of determinate
phenomena can be found to fill the concept. Yet in the realm ofpractical
reason this essential freedom can in a sense be known, in so far as our
moral action in itself dnrwnstralM the presence of the supersensual in the
sensual world: noumenal freedom within the domain of phenomenal
law. This is obviously not empirical knowledge. But it is knowledge -
of a higher realm of nature, altogether cleansed of the sensual: intelligible
nature. Moral action, then, is the intuition ofthe idea ofpractical reason,
the only certain knowledge available of the metaphysical world, and indeed
the only basis for postulates regarding the existence ofGod, freedom and
personal immortality. Fichte of course took the chance to identify this
consciousness with intellectual intuition (Zwdte EinkiJung, 472), and this
is at the root of his claim to have unified the practical and theoretical
philosophies.
The inspiring effect on Schiller and his generation of this lour deforce
of post-revolutionary self-determination, the crowning glory of Kant's
project to save metaphysics in modernity and the basis ofhis utopian po-
litical philosophy for the ethical state, is well documented. Even so, the
further problem arises as to whether and how the abstract and rigoristic
categorical imperative might be translated into everyday practice. Kant
had unconvincingly insisted that anyone might grasp his ethics, since they
are grounded in common-or-garden rationality (Grundlegung, 39n). With
this Schiller differed. His pioneering essay, Uba Anmul und Wiirde (1793;
On grace and digniry)'3 criticises the categorical imperative as harsh and
dualistic, from the characteristic standpoint ofSchiller's anthropological
holism. He agrees with Kant's ethical rigorism to the extent that the dic-
tation ofthe moral law must be free ofsensuous contamination, that duty
must ignore (for example) any striving for (merely individual) happiness.
evertheless human nature - despite the power ofKant's lTanScendental
analysis - is a holistic unity, irreducibly composed of intellect and sense.
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The categOl'ical imperative, sublime document of ethical desLilly as it is,
seems in reaJjty less to realise human freedom than to repeat the rrilstakes
of the Revolution, ruthlessly to e.~-pose human namre's wealmes in order
to enslave it, and in particular our corporeality, to pure practical reason
(463ff.). Thus it perperuates the fragmentation of the modern subject.
Kant had in fact already offered an alternative meruation between the
non-moral and the moral dispositions. Aestlletu ideas, he claimed, might
do ule job by providing ule less sophisticated, sensually determined mind
with an analog)' of ethjcal cognition. For in aesthetic experience, as Kant
de cribes it in ule first part of the Kritik der Urteilskrafl (1790; Critique qf
judgemc1l4, '4 we e.xperience objects in a particular and unique way: not
as objects of phenomenal knowledge but as sheer appea.rances, which
precisely in this bear a special rclation to ilie ethical. Aesilieuc experi-
ence is play: the harmonious play of inlagination and concepruaJjty in
ilie act ofreflective judgement (100), which spontaneously seeks the con-
cept for the complex and powerful intuition of an aesilietic work, and
derive pleasure from its satisfying purpo ivenes . Ofcourse no concept
is ever found. Purposiveness in aesthetic e),:perience is a purely formal
property, which is never ex-pressed in some purpose outside itself, so that
the object acquires the semblance ofautonomy. Without a concept aes-
thetic ex-perience is excluded from cognition smcuy so defined (221). But
judgements on art do claim a kind of objectivity and cognitive value.
Aesilietic pleasure is adminedly ubjective. However, it inheres in the
material form of ilie work, so that the particular experience is shared by
all subjects. To thai extent aesthetic judgements rightfully claim general
assent according to norms judged by the aesthetic sense or faculty of
taste (228). Beauty has a on of cognitive value too, in that aesthetic
experience inspires us (249ff.): ilie powerful intuitions of art factually
transcend understanding and so stretrn ilie mind beyond the domain of
e.'I.-perience. Hence Kant terms iliem aesilietic ideas. They are analogou
to ilie empirically inlpossible representation of ideas proper, concepts of
reason which may be well founded in reason but transcend any po sible
empirical intuition. Aesuletic ideas, then, generated by the genius, have
ilie potential to train us in moral action. For ilie appearance of freedom in-
evitably appeals to something in ilie subject which is more than nature.
It is not smctly freedom, but it does relale to Ule supersensual ground
of freedom. Furthermore, beauty and eiliical experience evince strong
emotional and structural parallels. Beauty is inlmediate, disinterested,
universally human, and characteristically harmonises antagonistic oppo-
sites (imaginative freedom and conceprual necessity). Ethjcal e:>.-perience
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too is immediate, disinterested (albeit in reason's interest), universally
human, and harmonises antagonistic opposites (freedom of the will and
rational necessity). In short, beauty can be accounted a SJ'mbol of the
morally good (297). As such, it potentially builds an existential bridge
between non-moral and moral dispositions to act: habituates us to bend-
ing imagination to reason's purpose (even when acting freely), teaches us
to find pleasure in sensuality without falling prey to sensual interest, and
facilitates the move from being sensually determrned to obeying reason's
interest without a behavioural leap.
In Uber Anmut und Wiirde Schiller remains anything but opposed to the
interest of reason, but he radicaJises Kant's tentative aesthetic mediation.
If reason's ethical interest is to be served reason must not domrnate;
sensuality and intellect must work together. For this to happen, however,
the subject's moral action in the phenomenal sphere must not merely be
aesthetically mediated, but must also express itself aesthetically. One who
obeys the Diktat ofthe categorical imperative is in theory acting freely, and
Kant certainly thought ofthis as the l.iberating triumph ofsupersensuality.
In fact, he visibly labours. He shows the compulsion in IUs body language
as the signature of the paradoxical violation of something fundamental
to his constitution as a human person. The interest of reason is, says
Schiller, better served if nature, in reason's realm, is allowed by reason
to remain nature - if ethical freedom e"'"presses itself not against, but
through body language, as second nature: beautifully. This uisible harmony
of freedom and sensuality, duty and inclination, is 'Anmut', grace. Its
incarnation is of course the beautiful soul (Anmut und Wiirde, 468) whose
autobiography WUhelm Meister read. Its purpose is to enlist the aid of
sensuality in reason's project: to further humanity's destiny through the
harmonious union of the forces in human nature rather than division or
subordination. Schiller's aestheticising approach to the etlUcal orthodo".'y
of transcendental philosophy thus defines one chief function ofl.iterarure
in this epoch: under the guise of co-operation to preach the rights of
corporeality and person against idealism's abstract concept of subject.
In this, Schiller's aesthetic meta-Kantianism is also one of the earl.iest
e>;pressions of the critique of the dialectic of Enlightenment, whereby
the systematic application of reason characteristic of Kant in particular
and modern culture in general is argued to produce rationality and
irrationality, freedom and compulsion, in equal measure.';
Schiller's elegy 'Der Tanz' (1796; 'The dance') is a good example of
what he means in Anmut und Wiirde. These elegant neo-classical distichs
celebrate how, in the dance, music's gentle discipl.ine magically liberates
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the body from natural constraint - as the clumsy skiIf suddenly glides in
the stream. But this is not all. In the dance a further, higher principle
of social ordering - second nature - seems harmoniously to regulate
natural appetite. Where the spontaneous, apparently wilful moves of
individual couples into the whirling mass threaten ehaos and destruction,
in fact the power of musical harmony guarantees that new order and
form ensue. The poem is thus revealed as an allegory of tlle relevance
of aesthetic grace to the social problem. Even the natural universe is
so governed. The inspiring rhymm of living being and the infmitely
complex, yet orderly paths ofheavenly bodies through the cosmos are like
the dance: examples of a universal principle of self-regulating Nemesis,
which reconciles freedom and necessity, chaos and order, body and mind,
individual and totality, change and continuity, in the measured aesthetic
vision, which is henceforth to be respected in life as much as in art.
Sc1liller systematically propounded tllis programme in a lengthy series
of poems, [rom 'Die Kunstler' (1789; 'Theartists') on.
Sehiller's most inlportant single work, Vber di£ iisthetische Er!-i£hung des
Menschen (1795; On the aesthetic educatUm rfhumanity),'6 makes the ambition
of this aesthetic programme fully explicit. Here he frankly tllematises an-
tagonism in the body politic following the French Revolution. Both the
French Revolution and German reforms are crude attempts to impose
reason on the 'natural' state. By antagonising rather than working with
what is natural in the state they paradoxically repress ethical freedom.
Thus me political problem is but a wider expressi()n of modernity's ba-
sic ill: the personal fragmentation diagnosed in Vber Anmut und Wiirde.
The domination of either rationality or sensuality must be undone. But
not by philosophy. ':\'ith tlle establishment of tlle moral law, philosophy's
task is exhausted (Asthetische Er!-i£hung, 590f.). Instead, the c."-perience of
beauty is me necessary condition of humanity (600), the onlY way to
make people under the one-sided determination of either sensuality or
rationality truly humane (641). This is so, Schiller explains in an ex-
hilarating if hyperbolic reformulation of Kantian aestlletic autOnomy,
because, uniquely, the apparently self-determining beautiful object ac-
tually does instantiate freedom in (empirical) appearance, not merely in
the way the subject might ell.-perience it. To sensualists, the numinous
reality of self-determination is revealed in an aptly sensual medium, and
creates in them the disposition to moral sovereignty. To ethical rigorists,
the cause ofsensuality is pleaded with grace. Only thus, in the transitional
zone where philosophy's writ does not run, is the mediation between sen-
suality and ethical form possible. Thus art now clainls responsibility for
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realising the ethical and political project of practical philosophy. From
this flows a programme of universal aestheticisation of human experi-
ence. Schiller demands in answer to Kant and the Revolution and in
direct alfront to the Platonic tradition 17 nothing less than the aesthetic
state.
This, then, is the full reason why Meister does not consult a philoso-
phy manual on his journey to self-cultivation, and why Wilhelm Meisters
Lehrjahre merit their place in Athenaeum.s-Fragment no. 216. When Meister,
with his paradigmatic desire for self-development, passes through art to
moral sovereignty, he does not merely encounter the beautiful soul. He
also - albeit not without criticism - encounters Schiller's meta-Kantian
theory of an's transformative power and programme for restoring the
human wholeness beyond philosophy. Philosophy may have identified the
tendency of the modern age, but, as Schiller said in Uber naive und senti-
mm.talische Dichtung (1795-6; On naive and riflective poetry), modernity's gain
is also loss, and that loss can only be recuperated through aesthetic
discourse. Art thus also becomes the organ ()f cultural memory and
prophet of the utopian futw·e in bad times (Asthetische Erziehung, 594).
Classical antiquity offers the lost ideal of holistic self-fulfilment. Goethe
and Schiller become committed classicists, typically in works such as
Schiller's 'Die Goner Griechenlands' (1788; 'The gods of Greece') and
Goethe's 'Romische Elegien' (1790; 'Roman elegies'), both ofwhich seek
to synthesise the reflexivity which is the strength and weakness ofmodern
culture with the naivety and spontaneity of the classical idyll. Thus at
the dawn of modernity, as Schlegel saw, literature and philosophy share
a path but also begin to diverge. Schiller and Goethe inaugurate the tra-
dition ofaesthetic modernism,'8 in which the emergence of the notions
of absolute subjective freedom in philosophy and reason's absolute au-
thority in culture call forth an aesthetic discourse criticising rationalistic
excess. The new belief in the cognitive and performative power of art
and literature led to an explosion of creativity in aesthetic theory and
experirnentalliterature.
The authoritative tone of Athenaeums-Fragment no. 216 betrays that
Friedrich Schlegel and his fellow early German Romantics saw their role
as more than acknowledging the achievements ofidealism and classicism.
Like classical humanism, Romanticism emerges in large part from a lit-
erary reception of philosophy as the dominant discourse of the Enlight-
enment, but here the respective irnponance of Kant and Fichte hUts.
Both Goethe and Schiller had studied Kant intensively.'9 Goethe had in
1794 appointed Fichte to the University ofJena. But most of his copies
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ofFichte's works remained obstinately uncut.20 As allusions to Fichtean
concepts in the As/helische Ervehung suggest," Schiller had read more. In
the end, however, the classical duo dismissed the '\'Vissenschaftslehre' as
a hypertrophic version of the common-sense distinction between subject
and object. But for the early Romantics Fried,;ch Schlegel and Friedrich
von Hardenberg ovalis) the thinker of absolute subjective sovereignty
was the unquestioned philosophical hero. They used Fiehte, who wrote
no aesthetics, to found their own programme, called first 'Fichtisiren'
(Fichticising) 0'"S1I, 524, no. II) and later 'Romantisiren' (Romanticising)
(NS 11, 545, no. 105). Here the disjunctive Kantian relation of aesthetic
experience to philosophical cognition, already blurred by Schiller's pro-
motion of aesthetic e""perience as the voice of holistic human truth, was
much more radically redefined.
The fundamental document of this move are Hardenberg's Fichie-
S/udic/l, philosophical studies of Fichte over the period 1795-6 (NSII, 104-
296). These recognise the problem offragmentation, but focus less on the
aspect of holistic human truth than on expansion of self-consciousness
from the perspective of the Fichtean ab olute. \"'here Fichte had con-
stantly claimed that what he had to say and the way of saying it were
ontologically incommensurable, Hardenberg's Fidl/e-Studien begin and
end with problems of writing and representation. As with Fichte, the
chief problem of philosophy is the meta-critique of Kant: the thinking
of identity in the structure of reflection. Howeve,; Hardenberg focuses
not only on the abstract form of the problem, but also on a concrete
aspect, namely, that reflection on identity must occur in a medium: a
representation, a language ofsome kind. Things (such as 'I' and' ot-I'),
must be named in order to form pan of the process of reflection. But
the name of the thing i derivative and as such cannot fix its essential
being. Where there is only voice (things coming into being) there can be
no echo (NSn, 202). This sceptical and relativistic view of representation
does not however make Hardenberg into a Shandyesque linguistic critic
ofabsolute subjectivism. He accepts the Fichtean framework, in that the
definition of the subject must flow from its reciprocal opposition to the
object, and that logically a prior totality, an all-encompassing 'sphere'
of being, must be thought in which this reciprocal definition takes place.
That totality is however now recognised to be beyond naming and to
transcend the representational structure of reflection altogether. We are
left with the recognition that the philosophical absolute, whilst logically
necessary, is paradoxicaUy an absence, at best an intuition of lost but
yearned-for totality from the standpoint of alienated modern reflection.
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Our LaSk, then, ifwe are to think identity, ha become aesthetic: to cOllstruct
totaliry in language on the basis of that privileged primal intuition. The
constructed absolute is technically a fiction. But it is a necessary one,
for it alone transcends reRection, makes the absem ab olute in some
sense presem and imelligible in the prosaic e,·eryday. As a repre enta-
tion it is however also constitutionally provisional and relative, subject to
wlending revision. It realises the ideal, but must also be acknowledged
as only an experimenLal attempt. The transcendental self thus loses its
f1Xed Canesian-Fichtean foundation. FLxed in a deeply ironic relation to
being and realiry, it becomes a fundamentally unstable construct, oscil-
lating between something and nothing. This genesis of RomanLicism in a
fusion ofabsolute idealism and linguistic scepticism accounts for its char-
acteristically paradoxical stance of utopianism (unending perfectibiliry)
and irony.
Romantic writing i the practical consequence of this: philosophico-
aesthetic performances which do nOl so much represem the absolute as
enact the palindromic figure of thought given by the process of idealistic
construction and ironic retraction. At the end of the Firht.e-Studierz this
is formulated gnomically as the need to represem the sensual spiritu-
ally and the spiritual sensually (NS u, 283, no. 633). The developmem
from 'Fichtisiren' to 'Romanrisiren' in Hardenberg's c1assi formulation
of 1797 clarifies the technique. Romanticisation, commonly understood
since Heine as escapist martipulation ofthe banal facts ofalienated every-
day e"..perience (as moonshine transfigures ashen nightscape), in fact
performs a bi-polar destabilisation of textual referentialiry. The con-
tents of everyday consciousness - ordinary, common, well-known finite
things - are in Hardenberg's metaphor 'pOlentialised': endowed with ule
semblance of high significance. mystery, trangenes, infinil); in shon, a
relation to the absolute. But there is al 0 a corresponding, equal and
opposite move. Our notions of the ideal the higher, the unknO\\Tl, the
mystical, the infinite, are 'logarithmicised': humoristically reduced in
emantic stature by being identified "';Ul their banal opposite. All this
is intended as a provocation (NS II, 282) of the late eighteenth-century
philistine subject's latent freedom: the liberation of pure transcenden-
taliry from the bounds of phenomenal consciousness on the one hand,
combined with a healthy sense of self-irony on the odler.
There are far-reaching consequences of dill semi-modernist, semi-
mystical constructivism. Hardenberg and ule Romantics abandon the
fundamenLal orientation ofboth Kant's and Fichte's (indeed all German
School) philosophy towards sy tem. Romantic thought has and can
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only have the character of a fragment: 'the systemless, systematised'
(NS fl, 289, no. 648). Hardenberg's theory ofknowledge is also less ratio-
cination than intuitive poiesis. We know things only by making them in
words. The essential activity ofintellect, as Hardenberg states elsewhere,
consists in transforming otherness into ownness, turning the world into
home (NS III, 434, no. 857). Human nature (recalling PlatoY' is in this
sense essentially poetic: humanjty is metaphor. Metaphorical making
competes boldly with propositionality as a theory of cognition;3 and
Kant's cautious acknowledgement of subjective sources of cognition is
dramatically radicalised: the aprioristic and divinatory fantasy experi-
ments of the poet are a better way of achieving insight into nature than
severe natural-scientific methodologies of observation and experiment.
All this makes up what Hardenberg calls 'Poesie', and with it comes
a corresponrnng elevation in status vis-ii-vis philosophy. He characteris-
tically attacks in metaphor philosophy's jagged peaks of pure reason'
(NS lV, 321) and especially Fichte's 'awesome spiral of abstractions'
(NS lV, 230). Rather, he says: 'Poetry is the authentically absolute
reality - this is the core ofmy philosophy. The more poetic, the more true'
(NSn, 647, no. 473). Echoing Schiller, he declares that philosophy's work
is done when its legislation has prepared the world for the influence of
ideas, but poetry is the key to philosophy, its task communicatively to
realise those ideas. Where Schiller had seen the poet as the only true hu-
man being and the age as sick, Hardenberg sees the transcendental poet
as the transcendental doctor of the human race. Later, the terms 'Poesie'
and 'Philosophje' become a kind ofcorrelated shorthand. 'Philosophie'
comes to mean less the continuing pursujt of truth through formaJjsed
procedures which endow knowledge c1ailns with authority than the ulti-
mative results already achieved by Kant and Fichte. Whenever Romantic
writers use the term 'Poesie', it connotes this implicit critique of philo-
sophy. In the end, poetry becomes for the Romantics a mythical entity.
Their texts are not only to realise philosophy's project, but also to in-
carnate absolute poetry. In this sense poetry becomes a cult, and the
cult of poetry comes to embody Germany's post-revolutionary answer
to the French religion of reason. The abstract qualjty of some of these
procedures should not mask their political status as a response to the
Revolution. 'Poesie', said Friedrich Schlegel, is a republican discourse.
The first literary fruit of thjs new shift in the terms of rnalogue be-
tween poetry and philosophy is the Romantic Fragment. Its inventor,
Friedrich Schlegel, shared much with Hardenberg. He saw intellectual in-
tuition, with its paradoxical transcendence ofreflection, as the categorical
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imperative (epistemological ideal) of theory (Alheruuums-Fragment no. 76;
KFSA 11, 176). He rejected both systematic thought and its opposite (no.
53; KFSA 11,173), and argued for the complementarity ofphilosophy and
poetry,24 Philosophical demonstrations, he said, were conducted in 'mil-
itarised' technical language, which merely served to legitimate claims to
intellectual territory once seized. Philosophical defmitions could at best
give hints, at worst say nothing or obscure everything. What mattered
was simply to know something and say it. In practice, it was far harder
to assen than prove something (no. 82; KFSA 11, 177). But even an asser-
tion was not final, merely a stepping stone ofargument. All this was not
philosophy but 'Symphilosophie' or 'Sympoesie': a shared intellectual
process of creation, which rejects traditional, monologous thought and
invites unending, dialogical exploration.
The Romantic Fragment is this characteristically assertoric yet open-
ended form, half discursive thought, half metaphorical divination.
Perhaps Schlegel's most brilliant Fragment is one of the smallest,
Athenaeums-Fragment no. 206. This looks like a sparse theoretical definition
of the genre: 'A Fragment must as a miniature work ofm be entirely iso-
lated from the surrounding world and perfect in itself, like a hedgehog.'
The Fragment, says Schlegel, must model totality: relate to the absolute
as autonomous microcosm does to macrocosm. Ofcourse his ending, the
simile of the (rolled up) hedgehog, depotentialises the pretentious asser-
tion with an abrupt rhetorical descent fTom the sublime to the ridiculous:
a willed humoristic disproportion between transcendental ambition and
textual achievement targeted at Schlegel himself and Romanticism in
general. Schlegel called this son of thing transcendental buffoonery. But
the point is that this Fragment, whilst it defines the genre, does not do
so as a definition in the abstract 'military' language of (philosophical)
aesthetics. It embodies the definition of the genre by eruuting what it says,
and so being a Fragment: momentarily perfect, finally incomplete. It is
not theory but intuition, or rather both theory and intuition, definition
and thing. Thus it instantiates Schlegel's ideal ofRomantic epistemology:
intellectual intuition as 'categorical imperative of theory'.
Ofcourse for the Romantics all texts, irrespective ofgenre and whether
considered by their author to be 'finished' works or not, are inainsically
fragmentary. Received notions ofauthor, work and text are revised so as to
give the aesthetic tum ofGoethe and Schiller still another, unmistakably
hermeneutic twist. Homer's classic texts, as Schlegel discovered through
the Gottingen scholar F. A. Wolf, were in fact not finished when written by
their named author, but successively modified by later, anonymous critics
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reflecting on and pel{ecting the 'originals'. or was Goethe's Meisler,
their great modern counterpart, complete. Schlegel's Uber GoetJles Meisler
(1798; On Goelhe's Afeisler) began the process of revising it. Reflective criti-
cism is thu more than just evaluation or interpretation. A critic recreates
the original text, once digested, at a higher level, and criticism attain
the same dignity as poetry or philosophy proper. The Romantics hardly
abandoned Kantian individualistic genius in favour ofcollective creativ-
ity, but for them the notion of authorship is fundamentally relativised
and pluralised. Hardenberg offered its paradigmatic formulation: 'The
true reader must be the author, expanded (NS 11,470, no. 125).
These early insights helped to refound a scholarly di cipline.
The hermeneutics of Friedrich SehJeiermaeher (1776-1834), conceived
around 1805-6 and first systematised in 1819, but only published as
Herm£/lculik und Krilik (Herllleneuli£s and criliasm) in 1838;; develop the
germinal ideas of his friends. By profession a Berlin reformed theolo-
gian, Schleiermaeher had made his name with Uber die Religion. RedCll 01/
die Gebi/delCII Ulller ihrCII Verticillem (1799; 011 religion. Addresses If) its cultivaled
despisers), which sought to make religion appeal to the secular mentality
of the educated classes by grounding religious experience (irrespective of
particular doctrine) in the familiar, philosophically respectable Romantic
concept of totalising intuition. Like Schlegel and Hardenberg Schleier-
macher had come to be convinced that thought is not independent of
the language in which it is cast. Judgements, then, are not purely log-
ical, but also expressive and interpretative acts embedded in the pre-
existent structure of communication. The Kantian abstract schemati m
of concept and inruition must therefore be complemented by a linguis-
tic schematism which mediates the individual Ullerance of the author
with the totality of the language he and his reader use, and dialectics
(Schleiermacher's logic) must be complemented by hermeneutics. In this
he not only anticipates the Saussurian categories of(general) 'langue' and
(individual) 'parole', but is also the author of the term 'speech act' later
popularised by J. L. Austin (HmnClleutik und Kritik, 89; c( 76fT). A text,
then, is an intrin icalJy individual and histQl'ical e':pression of the univer-
sal, to gra~p it the purpose of hermeneutics. The deceptively simple for-
mulation of this aim - adequate comprehension ofanother's text (71) - in
fact requires a twofold analysis of text and context. Grammatical analy-
sis covers the externality of the language used. From this standpoint the
author is merely the site ofa particular utterance, the meaning ofwhich
can only be grasped as conditioned by the totality of existing seman-
tic possibilities in the language as a whole. Psychological analysis on the
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other hand recognises the innovative power ofindividual creativity (style,
168), and only the interpreter's subjective divination of the intended new
sense (16gf.) can launch the process of understanding proper. The art
of hermeneutics demands the synthesis of both approaches. Schlegel,
provocative as ever, had insisted that the critic must understand the au-
thor bener than the author himself. Schleiermacher's formulation of his
(unattainable) hermeneutic ideal - 'to understand a text first just as weU
and then better than its author' (94-) - consciously echoes this.
But of course the main expression of thc Romantics' hermeneu-
tic approach was their literary writing, in particular the ultimate ex-
pression of 'Poesie': the Romantic novel. Almost aU Romantics -
Hardenberg, Friedrich Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck, Clemens Brentano,
E. T. A. Hoffmann, Joseph von EichendorfT - wrote at least one. The
Romantic novel attempts to synthesise aU known genres in a constantly
evolving would-be absolute mode ofdiscourse. But it was also a mode of
hermeneutic criticism, a syrnpoetical dialogue with a constantly evolv-
ing 'classic' text. Palimpsest-like, most Romantic novels respond to the
epoch-making 'tendency' of Wilhelm Meisler. But they also respond to
philosophy. Schlegel (tlUnking of Socrates in Plato's Apology)'6 saw phi-
losophy as the true home of irony (Kritisches Fragment, no. 4-2), but this
only supported his assertion that (Romantic) novels were the Socratic di-
alogues ofrus day (no. 26). Schlegel set no limits to their form or theme.
In practice, almost all preach the myth ofpoetry as meta-philosophy and,
transcending both Goethe and Fichte, treat some aspect of the crisis of
subjectivity in wruch a specific limitation ofphilosophical talk is overcome
by aesthetic means. Often allusions to Plato (the representative idealist
philosopher of classical antiquity) introduce tllcse arguments. Novels
by Hardenberg, Friedrich Hblderlin, friedrich Schlegel and Clemens
Brentano exemplify this.
Hardenberg's Heimuh von Oflerdingm (1800-2) was an 'apotheosis of
poetry"7 intended to overcome tlle ambiguous view of art in Wilhelm
Meislers Lehrjahre. Unlike \1\ ilhelm, Heiru;ch is not halfbut a whole poet,
and the story shows how mythic poetry o'iumphs over prosaic earthly ex-
istence. In particular, it transforms the temporal horizon ofhis conscious-
ness, and in this Hardenberg also takes up a famous Platonic problem. In
tlle Pamlenides:8 Plato had analysed a paradox of temporality. In time's
unear flow motion and rest cannot be conceived togetller. Where one is,
tlle other cannot be. Some higher, transitional zone, a quintessentially
Platonic privileged vantage point inside but outside of time, must exist to
mediate their relation. Plato calls it the 'moment', but also considered it
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beyond conceptuality. The apotheosis of Heinrich's life story isjust such
a 'moment'.
This works through an original narrative technique. Early on,
prompted by an encounter v.-ith a wandering poet, Heinrich has an
extraordinary dream which represents the birth of poetic consciousness
in him. In a (platonic) cave he bathes in the wellsprings of creation, the
mmstruum universale of the cosmic imagination. Here, mere thinking is
creation of self and other. This phase of the dream, then, is a literary
figuration ofintellectual intuition·g From this highest level of ideality he
passes to external nature, which strangely resembles the earlier domain.
In a third realm, ideal and real are synthesised, and he is captivated by a
woman's face in the corolla of a large blue flower. All this signifies what
the title of part one of the novel suggests: cx-pectation. The tlip in the
mCIlStruum universale connotes initiation into the poetic nature of absolute
reality and his awakening self-understantling as part of natura naturallS.
The move into everyday reality suggests subsequent entrapment in the
domain ofthe 'Not-I'. The last phase suggests that love (the woman's face)
unites the two realms. When however in part two expectation becomes
fulfilment and the dream events unfold in empirical fact, dream and re-
ality, past and future, merge. The reader's perspective is dislocated into
a zone where all three temporal dimensions ofHeinridl's life dissolve in
the paradoxical continuum of a boundless present, inside yet outside of
time's flow, the unity of Heinrich's fuUte consciousness with the infinite
productivity ofhis origin. This skilfully constructed totalising perspective
of immanent transcendence,30 then, is the Platonic 'moment', Roman-
ticised. It is the fIrst of those renowned epiphanic moments which aim
to recover the authentic self in modernistliterature.3'
Friedrich Hblderlin (1776-1843), friend of Schelling and Hegel, and
v,-ith Hardenberg the most powerful poet-philosopher ofthe fIrst Roman-
tic generation, had followed a strikingly similar path to his own version
ofthe myth ofpoetry. He argued in the untitled landmark essay known as
Seyn, Urlheil, Modalitiit (1794; Being, judgem£T/t, modali!yp' that subject and
object were ontologically one in intellectual intuition, but that this one-
ness should not be logically confused with identity. Self-consciousness
is only possible through a reflective tlivision of the primal oneness of
being, in which T and 'Not-I' are separated. Identity is thus incommen-
surable with the unity ofabsolute being and itself entails fragmentation.
Absolute identity is pre- or meta-reflexive, in this sense past. As with the
Romantics, we can only go forward to it, by other means. The cognitively
accentuated experience of beauty, with its characteristic harmonisation
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of antagonistic opposites (recall the pioneering Kantian definition) be-
comes for Holderlin the means to attain unity at a higher level.
His novel Hyperion oda da Eremit in GrUchenland (I797---g; Hyperion, or the
hermit in Greece),33 the story ofan idealist striver in contemporary Greece
under Russo-Turkish colonisation, exemplifies this figure of thought in
an historical scheme. Hyperion suffers from the fragmentation and lim-
itation characteristic of modernity, be it the division in his personality,
of Greece from its past and destiny, the individual from the state, or
humanity from nature, and the novel tells of his progress towards res-
olution of these conflicts. His guide in this has the same name as the
woman who, in Plato's Symposium, teaches Socrates the true meaning
and nature oflove: Diotima.34 Love, Eros, is for Socrates' wisest woman
not a god but a daemon, a mediating figure between the mortal and
immortal realms, whose nature consists not in possession of the good,
the true and the beautiful, but in striving for them - proceeding via the
vision of beautiful form, deeds and knowledge to the vision of absolute
beauty itself. Only this makes life worth living, makes the mortal capa-
ble of creating the good, the true and the beautiful, of being loved by
the gods, and so of reaching immortality.35 As he looks back on a life of
failed striving, it is Holderlin's Diotima who offers Hyperion hope. But
this Diotima prefers silence to talk. When she speaks, it is in song, indeed
her entire being seems to consist in this sense in poetry (Hyperion, 660),
so that Hyperion's encounter with Diotima is less the Socratic process of
progressive philosophical enlightenment through dialogue with a wise
woman than the overcoming of division and ascent to the vision of di-
vine beauty through love of beauty personified, a muse. For Hyperion,
inspired as he is by the encounter with Diotirna, philosophy - as Minerva
springs from the mind ofJupiter (685) - is the secondary (Athenian)
creation of a totalising poetic vision. It will finally become poetry again
(685). The work ofunderstanding is mere division, and even reason must
follow the vision of beauty, the differentiated oneness ('das Eine in sich
seiber unterscruedne') of Heraclitus (685ff.) which alone gives meaning
to reason's 'demands' (687). Now seeing this appears to come too late.
Diotima and Hyperion have separated: he is carried off in a doomed
war of liberation, she by illness. However, Holderlin's novel is not one
of action but of sentimental remembrance. Its point is anamnesis, the
re-caIJ and re-presentation of the past, so that the past's meaning thCTeby
becomes present, and Hyperion's ascent to higher vision is enacted in
the text. Stranded in philistine Germany, H yperion flees to an oasis of
natural beauty and ell."periences a privileged anamnesis of Diotima in
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response to hjs yearning. The recuperated presenmess of the vision of
beauty in the German cultural desert for a moment unites writer and
written, releases his poetic voice, makes the novel possible, and sends
him on his poetic mission (759f.).
H.J'Penon contIDns a further allusion to the S;'mposium when the hero
refers to the (in another sense holistic) androgynous oneness wmch he
and Diotima enjoy, in that their love overcomes scxual difference and lim-
itation and makcs each fully human. Friedrich Schlegel's LucilUie (1799)
rarucaJjses thjs argument (KFSA II, 1-82). HereJulius tells a conventional
Meisteresque story ofms search for self-fulfilment, wmch passes through
stations of emotional, intellectual and artistic development, each em-
bodied by a woman (or a man), until he finds Lucinde. Thus Lucinde
preaches a full-blown aesthetic-androgynous utopia. Lucinde is a beau-
tiful, Diotima-jjke muse for whom life and love are identical and who
typically embodies the eighteenth-century gender slere0type of woman
as undivided ideal of wholeness and closeness to nature (62). But bou1
Julius and Lucinde are artists who make their relationship in the po-
etic sense (65). She too has received the artistic vocation (trarutionally
the male privilege), and is Julius' intellectual equal. Thus they pursue
the aesthetic-erotic ideal of androgyny through sympoetic exchange.3G
They internalise each other's gender role in aesthetic mimicry. Together
they explore the gamut of human c""perience from richest sensuality to
strictest intellectualjty. In short: lim:ng beautiful androgyny is the nighesl
truth. IndeedJulius' and Lucinde's umon enacts both life as art and, as
its brilliantly innovative form demonsu'ates, the 'moment' of totality (16):
Julius' life is cast as a brief nalTative; but it is embedded in the centre of
an arabesque of non-narrative text-types, so that the beginning and end
of hjs story are russolved in the timeless embrace of Lueinde's presence.
In a new twist, however, Godwi, ada das sleineme Bild da Multer. Ein
vawildater Roman von MARlA (1800-2; Godwi, or the ston£ image ifLIM moth£/". A
nove!gone wild, by MARIA)3i by Clemens Brentano (1778-1842) dramatises
the fajjure of the Romantic pursuit of the self. At one level a pendant to
Lucintk, it explores the mystery of Godwi's sexuaJjry as he seeks to reaJjse
the androgynous utopia with Molly and Violetta. Godwi is, however, most
significant at the formal level, where rugression and Romantic irony
indeed run wild. While part one i5 cast in traditional epistolary form,
part two enacts a loss ofauthorial control. Maria increasingly thematises
hjs ironic despair offinj5hing the novel (225), longs for it 10 be over, kneels
before Godwi and begs forgiveness for having written it, promjses never
to repeat the misdeed, and at last persuades his main fictive character to
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serve as co-author - the joke being, of course, that all this merely makes
the text longer. Ultimately, Godwi (415) tells of Maria's death, carried
off by a fatal inflammation of the lOngue. But even here Godwi does nOl
manage to end. In perhaps the longest unclosed ending ever written,
biographical monuments 10 Maria, broadly hinting at his identity with
'Clemens Brentano' (450) (whose middle name was Maria) proliferate.
Here the death of the author is establised long before Foueault declared
it. The novel moves from the convention whereby a 'real' author narrates
a fictive life to a parodistic position from which the fictive character not
only criticises the truth value of fiction, but also narrates the death of
the 'real' author, so that fiction, once launched, consumes all. In this
excess of non-closure the Romantic self is less recovered than trapped.
Godwi contains a typically Romantic attack on Fichte's regressive version
of self-consciousness in intellectual intuition (234f.) as placing shadow
in the stead of substance. But his aestheticist alternative culminates in a
regress of its own.
Jean Paul Uohann Paul Friedrich Richter, /763-1825) typifies how
far the commitment to aestheticist truth-finding was prevalent among
writers around ,800. He shared the Romantics' metaphysical hunger
and ironic humour and the classicists' desire for anthropological whole-
ness. Yet he allied himself with neither, dismissing the Romantics in
particular as poetic nihilists arrogantly proposing and disposing of the
world from the bastion of their egotism.38 His Bildungsroman Tlkln (1800)
echoes Brentano's Fichte critique. The Fichtean Schoppe, who can-
not distinguish between his self and the world it generates, dies of
shock when encountering his double.39 Philosophically gifted and in-
fluenced by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's philosophical leap into faith,
Jean Paul could never have agreed ,.vith Kant either. His major debate
with the critical philosophy is crystallised in Das Kampaner Thai oder iiber die
UnsterblUhkeit tier Seele ('797; The Vale f!! Campana, or on the immortaiiry f!! the
soul).40 Kant's philosophy, he says (alluding 10 the categorical impera-
tive), daily proves our immortality. Bur this kind of proof is not enough.
Only emotion can change a person; even the philosopher in his abstract
world needs emotion. But only poetry can function as philosophy's 'elec-
trical condensor', and amplify the abstractions of philosophy into (emo-
tive) bolts of healing electricity (s63f.). The demonstration of this is Das
Kampaner Thai itself, the poetic rendition ofa sentimental journey through
a paradisal valley, where newly-wed friends debate as they stroll. The
main opponent of jean Paul' is the chaplain a declared Kantian. He
keeps his distance from jean Paul' because writers engage with life. The
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philosopher by contrast treats all vital ('kraftig') truths and eX"periences
as the ant does seeds in his nest: he bites out their living germ so that
they will not grow, and uses them as building material. The main con-
flict comes over immortality. The Kantian is teased. Kant's ethics had
insisted that the value of virtue lay in the struggle for the good in itself,
nO! in the happiness which the prospect of immortality might ofTer as
a reward. In that case, the ",'Titer's companion Karlson argues, philoso-
phers ought positively to attack the prospect of immortality. Indeed, if
belief in immortality might make us immoral in this world, what will
experience of it in the next do to us? Worse: if immortality cannot be
demonstrated, why make its indemonstrability a reason for believing in
it? The purpose of this dubious \\;t is 10 showcase poetry's alternative.
Metaphysical speculation, they accept, is dead. Yet, like crystals embed-
ded in the glacier, there is something in humanity - virtue, truth, beauty-
which is of, but more than nature (611 f.). It is these forces, capable of
creating a higher world in us ",;th no original in nature, which suggest
an inner, higher reality. To this humans belong and for it, as strangers
here, they yearn. Only the feeling for this discloses our immortality. Thus
neither philosophical arguments nor ethical action but an irnage of im-
mortality, plucked from but transcending nature, dominates at journey's
end: the night ascent in two Montgolfier hot-air balloons in which the
characters stand suspended in the ether between heaven and earth - of
the earth, yet ",;th a view of paradise (624/I). Literature's task for jean
Paul is the metaphorical revelation of the infinite in the finite.
Philosophers themselves were nO! immune 10 the arguments poets
invented 10 raise the cognitive and performative dignity of aesthetic ex-
perience. The unidentified author ofDas iillesl£ Syslemprogramm des deulschm
ldealismus" (1795; TI/£oldestsysl£maticprogrammer!fGerman idealism), an early
idealist manifesto, insisted that the highest act of reason was an aesthetic
act and a myth. One of its possible authors, Friedrich Wilhelm joseph
Schelling (1775-1854), was not only the schoolmate of the other can-
didates for authorship, Hblderlin and Hegel, but also a dose associate
of the early Romantic circle in jena. A philosophical Wunder/rind who
at twenty-two held a chair in philosophy at jena, Schelling had heard
Fichte's lectures, and is certainly in the mainstream of the idealist tra-
dition, but he gives his solution of the identity problem a significantly
different, aesthetic emphasis in the tradition of the lilmles Systemprogramm.
In one of his early writings, Vom lch als Princip der Philosophie oder iiber das
Unbedingl£ im menschlichen Wissen (1795; On the I as principle r!fphilosophy or tflR
unconditional in human knowledge);" he affirms the Romantic-Hblderlinian
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critique of Fichte's intellectual intuition. When we seek to think the un-
conditional or absolute as the highest point ofknowledge, we must accept
that the absolute stricuy o"anscends the relational subject-object srruc-
ture of thought. But ifwe can refer to the absolute at all, there must exist
a pre-reflexive intuition of it l57f.), and this intuition, since it cannot be-
long to the conditioned domain of sensuality (69ff.), must be intellectual
('intellektuale', in Schelling's characteristic spelling). What this means
for philosophy becomes clear in the .s;'stem des lranscendentalen Jdealismus
(1800; System ifIransc/Jlld/Jlltal idealism).43 Like Fichte, Schelling deduces a
kind of a priori narrative of the becoming of subject and object, intel-
lect and nature. If the absolute is to know itself as identity, then it must
negate its own, unlimited productivity. Thus is constituted a world torn
by that which binds it together, the contradictory tension of infinite and
finite, ideal and real energies of which every part of its fabric is made.
Relative stability can be conferred on this structure only by thinking it
as endlessly becoming (450f.), in that Ule infinite productivity constanuy
creates and then negates its finite, ideal-real product in a series of ever
higher, more ideal levels ofevolution, all ofwhich are orientated finally to
overcoming the primal division at a level of ultimate indifference. This,
in contrast to Fichte's sullenly resistant 'Nicht-leh', i.~ the domain of
positively living, organic nature, ofwhich - again in contrast to Fichte-
ule thinking subject is for Schelling a pan, and from which, as part of
this process, it emerges. Philosophy, then, divides for Schelling in this
phase of his career into two distinct areas, transcendental philosophy
and the speculative physics of NalurphiLosophie, the one devoted to de-
scribing the inner history and end of the evolution of consciousness, the
other the history of nature, each complementing the other in the story it
tells. This division oflabour, based on ule conception of an autonomous
realm ofnature distinct from ule transcendental subject, finally alienated
Schelling from Fichte. The NalurphiliJsophie had a pervasive influence on
the Romantic th.inking of nature. It is in the transcendental philosophy
iliat the influence of Romantic aesilieticism on Schelling can be seen.
For nature as product of ilie absolute has, says Schelling from the tran-
scendental philosophical standpoint (675ff.), two cognitive dimensions.
On the one hand, it is unconscious of its tendency. On the other, the
fact that it is what it is in ule chain of development exemplifies precisely
iliat tendency. Natural things ilius instantiate both blind mechanism and
teleological purposiveness, unconscious and conscious productivity, ne-
cessity and freedom; they cx'Press the finite and the infinite. But how
is this identity to be knO"~l as such, how is thinking to know the object
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not only as object but also as manifestation of absolute identity without
falling back inlO division? Only, Schelling insists, in the mode ofaesthetic
cognition, which in this pre-empts the completion of philosophy's task.
The genius, driven by dark creative forces analogous 10 those of the ab-
solute, produces by acts which are both conscious and unconscious art
which sublates all oppositions in the image of absolute harmony. The
infinite, thus finitely e.xpressed, is beauty (688), and an, though an arti-
ficial product, reveals in this sense the full truth of the natural process.
Art is thus an intuitive mode of knowing which uniquely shows both op-
position and knowledge thereofas identity, yet without reducing identity
to a mere object, and so destroying it. Art in this way represents what
philosophy cannot yet, and philosophy (echoing Holderlin's Hyperion)
must in this sense end as it began, in poetry (697).
Schelling's System des transwuienlalen Idealismus marks the apogee ofacs-
theticist influence over philosophical theories of cognition in our epoch.
In its wake came another variant of the demand for extending the leg-
islation of the aesthetic into the cognitive domain: aesthetic natural sci-
ence. Goethe, whose poetry (e.g. 'Mailied', 1770; 'May song') constantly
turns on the harmonisation of subject and nature, had long been a pi-
oneer of this (and consequently an outsider to the natural scientific es-
tablishment). Confessedly unphilosophical, he had nonetheless always
sought 10 support his explorations of natural phenomena by appeals
10 leading philosophers. Thus, having instinctively rejected as abstract
and fragmentary the dominant mathematical and analytical methods of
Enlightenment scientific research (most famously in his polemic against
NeWlOn's colour theory metilOdology), he ought 10 support his alter-
native - holistic intuition of living nature in its simplest, most univer-
sal forms, or 'Urphanomene' - by reference 10 Spinoza. Similarly, he
derived his notion of metamorphosis in plants and animals (of which
BildUlzg is a variant) from Leibn;z's concept of the developmental law
(entelechy) inherent in each monad. Later, when the rigorous method-
ology of Kantian criticism became the foundational discourse of sci-
entific cognition, Goethe struggled through some of the Kritik do rcilll:Jl
Vcmurifi and most of the Krilik der Urtei.lskrqfi. Their arguments for the
autonomy of aesthetic and natural phenomena seemed further 10 con-
firm his O\-vn convictions, and he certainly derived his notions ofpolarity
and intensification ('Polaritat', 'Steigerung') as fundan1entaJ natural laws
from the antagonistic teleology ofSchelling's Naturphilosophie. In keeping
with ancient tradition (Lucretius) and \vith his own view, Goethe some-
times also sought to present his scientific findings in aesthetic form. The
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didactic elegy 'Die Metamorpho e der Pflanzen' (1798; 'The metamor-
phosis of plants') renders the growth of plants in a striCt yet graceful
narrative of rhythmic becoming, which unfolds simple form (the 'primal
plant' or organ) through oppositional change to highest sopillstication
and in its flowering closes the ring of life and death, individual and
spccies. But although Schiller had tentatively offered aestheticisation as
a means of popularising specialist professional science, and Jean Paul
had argued in Dar KampaJza 77zal for the poet's ability to intuit natural
truths before the philosopher, Goethe never quite practised truly aes-
thetic science. In the Kritik da Urteilskrrift (239) Kant had after all dis-
missed any thought of aestheticising the sciences: beauty cannot provide
authentic cognitions.
It was Hardenberg who first proposed an authentically scientific po-
etry and the poeticisation ofaU scientific disciplines. In the field ofnatural
cience. his novel Die Lehrlinge zu Sais (1798; The apprentices at Sais) treats
in Schellingian fashion a theme from Schiller's Kantian baUad 'Das ver-
chleierte Bild zu Sais' (1795; 'The "eiled tatue at Sais'). Far more con-
ervative in this area than Goethe, Schiller turns motifs [rom Egyptian
mystery cults into a warning aUegory. The neophyte who transgresses the
limits of natural scientific exploration and unveils the statue oflsis, god-
dess of nature, pays ,,~th despair and death. Hardenberg's fragmentary
narrative contraclicts this. His neophyte is an autobiographical narrator,
one of many apprentices seeking truth in a temple which looks more
like a mining academy (Hardcnberg was a highly qualified and experi-
enced mining engineer). All a pire to a dark intuition wh.ich will decode
the language of nature tantalisingly hinted at in myriad diverse natural
formations. The text of Die Lehrluzge zu ais is the narrator's individual
solution. Its ke argument, as in Schelling, is the aesthetic character of
absolute cognition. In the main scene the neophyte listens baffled to a
many-sided philosophical debate on nature, one participant in which is
thought ro represent Fichte. When discussion collapses in a confusion of
abstract speculations, the implication is that discursive cognition olTers
no access to nature's highe t truth. At the same time, the entry ofa poetic
youth imo the circle ofdisputants on nature suggests that poetic intuition
and representation is the key - he tells a fairy tale invoh~g the unveiling
of the statue whicl1 successfully unites the finite and the infinite in the
self, and seems to describe the shape of d1e apprentice's life. Typically
for early Romanticism, thcre is no accompanying sense of threat.
The most ambitious expression of this tcndency is Hardenberg's
aesthetically founded encyclopaedia, the German counterpart to the
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intellectualistic project ofD'Alembert and Diderot. The extensive plans
are conserved as Das allgemeine BrouilLon (1798; The general notebook). Its
key is another variant on the aesthetic construction of the paradoxically
absolute standpoint, from which utopian perspective the specialisation
and conflict characteristic ofnatural sciences might appear to have been
unified and harmonised. The final form ofthe project is unclear. Its basic
representational strategy appears to have involved developing analogies
between the objective domains, languages and methods of the heteroge-
neous disciplines (NS Ill, 246, no. 49). As the 'Ich' can only be grasped
through the (inadequate) representation of what it is not, so onc branch
ofscience necessarily requires explication through another. A network of
reciprocating correspondences - this points forward to Baudelaire - can
thus be set up (usually involving metaphors), which suggests the inner
relatedness of all scientific endeavour. Hardenberg certainly hoped to
suggest new cognitive paths,44 but the main aim would have been the
aesthetic restructuring of the vast amount of material in Das allgemeine
Brouillon.
The aesthetic thinking of nature in the Romantic style was also the
element of the most powerful woman poet-philosopher of the epoch,
Karoline von Giinderrode (1780-1806). A close friend of Clemens and
Bettina Brentano, Giinderrode - compared \\~th Hypatia45 by her lover,
the cultural anthropologist Friedrich Creuzer - was deeply influenced
by the early Romantics' proto-feminist theorisations of androgyny. In
Lucinde, as we have seen, Friedrich Schlegel showed Lucinde sharing
in the historically male acti\~ty of philosophising ~th Julius - a rad-
ical step, given the dominant Rousseawst gender anthropology of the
age, which belittled woman's natural capacity..for abstract thought.46 In
the Athenaeum Schlegel published An Doro/hea. Uber die PhiLosophie (1800; To
Doro/hea. On philosoph),), where he elaborated his ideas about women's par-
ticipation in intellectual life to the model for Lucinde, his Mfe Dorothea
Mendelssohn-Schlegel. This Giinderrode extensively excerpted,47 and
she evidently took seriously the admonition to reflecL Between 1802
and 1804 she intensively studied fundamental Romantic and philosoph-
i~a1 tcxts:48 the Athenaeums-Fragmmte, Novalis. Schrijien, Schleiermacher's
Uber die ReligWn, Fichte's Die Bestimmung des Mensclzen (1800; The destiny
r!fhumankind), Kiesewetter's GrundrijJ einer allgemeinm Logik nach Kantisclu!I1
Grundsiitzen (1795-6; Outline r!fKantian logic). In her last two years she was
preoccupied by (among others) Schelling's System des transcendentalen ldea-
lismus, his Idem zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797; Id.easfor a philosoph)' r!f
nature) and Erster Entwwfeines Sysl.e7ns der Naturphilosophie (1799; First sketch
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ifa ~sl£nz ifnatural philosophy), and finally the history ofOriental religion.
GUnderrode's papers are not documents of creative reception to rival
Hardenberg's Fit:hte-Studien. But they are evidence ofmastery in the most
advanced philosophical and aesthetic concepts ofher day. What emerges
from this rigorous autodidactic philosophical schooling is a Romantic
poet who writes under the genderless pseudonym 'Tian'. Gunderrode
thus shares the aesthetic consensus, but asserts something the French and
Kantian revolutions did not- woman's autonomy in thought and deed-
and often seeks to impart a specifically feminine accentuation to her ar-
ticulations of Romantic (and classic) discourse. Her version of the Don
Juan myth is almost unrecognisable. The great womaniser is transfixed
by a princess's beauty and transformed into a Romantic lover for whom
only one woman will do, and at his tragic end he is cornfoned only by
her recuperated memory. Elsewhere 'Tian' contributes with robust intel-
lectuality to ongoing Romantic controversies. Her most successful work,
the drama Mahomed, der Prophet von Mekko. (1805; Mohammed, the prophet if
Mecca), is a poetic reflection on the validity of Schleiermacher's irenic
central category of religious experience, 'Anschauung des Unendlichen'
('intuition of the infinite'). At issue here is precisely the authenticity of
Mohammed's overwhelming yet subjective visionary intuitions, with
their claim to unify - ifnecessary by the sword - all positive religions. He
is presented as himself vacillating agonisingly between faith and doubt,
and the intrinsic division of the prophet's psyche is satisfyingly exter-
nalised as the antiphonic chorus. The fictive autobiography Geschit:hte
dnes Bramine1Z (1805; Story ifa BraJzmin){9 adopts the outsider's perspec-
tive - not a woman, but a man divided between European and Oriental
provenance - to preach a sermon against the commerciaJised egotism of
European culture. On the protagonist'S spiritual journey the first alter-
native to this he encounters, Kantian ethics, is rejected as self-fulfilment
at the cost of division (306). Commencing a life of introspection in the
Orient, A1mar turns to religion as the power which re-connects indi-
vidual and totality. He rejects Mohammed's use of violence to spread
the message and, having considered all other major historical religions,
ends with what he calls Brahmanism and equates with the unveiling
of the statue at Sais, but which is of course a version of Scbellingian
Nalurphilosophie: the intuition ofthe absolute as the primal, infinite ground
of all individuality. From this decentred perspective all creatures exist
for their own sake, all represent realisations of the infinite 'Naturgeist'
(nature spirit) along a ladder of perfection, which comes to unity with
itself in the highest forms ofconsciousness (312f.).
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But perhaps the most euphoric and influential expression of aes-
thetic natural science was a popular lecture series by GotthiJf Heinrich
Schuben (1780-1860) delivered in 1806-7: Ansichten von der Nachtseile der
NatuTwissenschaJten (Vzews rif tJu dark side rif lhe natural sciences).50 As the title
suggests, Schuben claims to have uncovered an unacknowledged dimen-
sion of cognition and its vehicle, a buried rradition of esoteric natural
science, which leads to ultimate understanding of nature. Its basis is of
course another version of ScheUingian Naturphilosophu, on which is su-
perimposed a Romantic sentimentalist cultural history of the kind we
saw in Di£ Lehrlinge zu Sais. At the origin of history humankind existed
not in a primitive state determined by crude material necessity, but in an
idyU of naive harmony with the totality of nature. In this phase reflective
thought is admittedly undeveloped. However, the ancient mysteries (such
as those stored in the archives ofthe temple at Sais, or the Atlantis legend)
embody an immediate intuition of the primal unity of humanity and na-
ture, individual and totality, past and future -tantamount to speaking the
language of nature (3-g). From this golden age, humanity has fallen into
an interim state of decline - history - characterised by reflective division
ofsubject and nature. But humanity is also progressing to a recuperated
union with nature. Evidence for this is the modern discovery of universal
forces such as gravity and magnetism, which seem to confirm the esoteric
claim of the inner connectedness of individual and totality. The hint of
the possibility of recovering Atlantean wisdom leads Schuben to his the-
sis. The basic form or law ofall creation and change is a state of ultimate
negativity, in which the indi,,;dual returns to its creative origin and from
which it emerges into a new, higher station in the chain ofbeing (2 I). Evi-
dence of this, the dark side of the natural sciences, are those unexplained
instances where creatures from one station of being seem to sympathise
with or anticipate phenomena in the next. Insects seem sympathetically
to anticipate plants' needs during pollination, animals natural disasters.
The modish phenomenon ofanimal magnetism (mesmerism, somnam-
bulism) is another typical irruption of one sphere of being into another.
The magnetic rrance is, says Schuben, nothing less than the anticipation
of humanity's higher life - the next, Atlantean station of being - in this.
This is so - despite the radical circumvention ofreflective thought which
is its condition ofpossibiJity (362)- because ofthe apparent vast potential-
isation of human cognitive powers in the rrance. The magnetised seem
miraculously able to examine inner body states, sense the presence of
minerals underground, read letters in closed envelopes, predict the future
and explore the past, and the like. They can do so, says Schuben, because
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the circumvention ofconsciousness releases the inherent sympathy of the
higher, physical organs of the body with the vast network ofaffinities that
is the universe, and so makes possible the perceptual e>o:pansion. Thu
history and natural history coincide, and the golden age is rediscovered.
The celebration of clairvoyance in the Ansichlen is the most remarkable
expression ofGerman intellectuals' willed faith in a redemptive intuition
bought at the price of the total rejection of conscious thinking, but it is
also the beginning of the discovery of the unconscious mind.
The first sign of decay in the utopian aesthetic consensus is the IEUlITe
of Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811), who shares Schubert's sceptical view
of thought's cognitive power. At first Kleist stands foursquare in the new
humanistic tradition. He rejects the profession of military officer be-
cause tyrannical di cipline is incompatible with Bildung, and embarks in
1799 on an encyclopaedic programme ofself-cultivation in the sciences,
philosophy and literature. But philosophy soon becomes problematic.
Committed originally to Enlightenment optimism and pre-critical teleo-
logical thinking, Kleist soon records in letters around 1800-1 a traumatic
10 of faith in the certainty of knowledge. This he ascribes to Kantian
philosophyY Kant had founded the certainty of empirical knowledge in
the a priori legislative capacity of the subject, but only in so far as it was
applied to phenomena under conditions which excluded the possibility
of knowing things in themselves or grasping any teleological purpose of
'nature' (except as a merely regulative principle of judgement). If the
evidence of the letters is to be credited, Kleist interprets this gain of
empirical certainty at the price of metaphysical certainty as leading to
radical scepticism. In what may be an allusion to the schematism of
judgement, he argue that if all people viewed the world through green
lenses, this constitution of their minds would make it impo sible to tell
if things were objectively green or if greenness were not simply a pro-
perty of the subject's way of seeing. That being so, not only is there no
metaphysical certainty, there is no certainty of empirical knowledge ei-
ther. If this analogy is meant as an allusion to Kant, then Kleist doe
not fully recognise how the Kantian categories function to create inter-
ubjective certainty. It is moreover notable that Kleist names only Kant
as his benchmark philosopher, ignoring the later solutions of Jacobi,
richte, Schelling and othersY Kleist is nonetheless thrown by this into
existential crisis, rejects philosophy and natural science, and turns to lit-
erature. Like SdlUbert he rejects thinking as a source of truth. As \vith
Schiller, Holderlin, Hardenberg and Schlegel, the critique ofphilo ophy
motivates his poetic vocation.
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\oVhat he does with literature is another matter. Where his contem-
poraries never doubted the (variously defined) cognitive or performative
power ofaesthetic intuition as an alternative to philosophy, Kleist's scep-
ticism is so deeply founded that he places no alternative faith in the aes-
thetic. He flins with Schubertian magnetism. In the popular drama Dos
Kiithchen von Heilbronn (1810; Kiithchen ofHeilbronn) and the Prussian tragedy
Der Prinz von Homburg (1811; The Prince ofHomburg) both Kathchen and
the Prince experience magnetic revelations. Alas these cause rather than
resolve conflict. Elsewhere, Kleist's literary writings are \\~thout excep-
tion nuth-seeking eJl:perirnents which explore the limits of both thought
and literature. An example of the former is the comedy AmphilIJ'On (1806).
Of this classical motif Kleist makes an agonising comedy of the identity
of indiscernible subjects. Amphirryon, having triumphed in battle, sends
his servant Sosias to Thebes ,vith the good news. Unfortunately that
very night Jupiter has taken advantage of the general's absence, magi-
cally assumed his shape, and pleasured his wife Alkmene. Sosias too loses
his identity as Mercury takes on Sosias's form. From this a comedy un-
folds which constantly threatens tragedy as human cognitive powers (and
their emotional consequences) are tested to the limit. The problem is that
Jupiter and Mercury are nue doubles, indiscernible from their originals,
so that not only Alkmene, but even the originals doubt their sense of
selfhood, which seems to derive not from autonomous self-definition but
from heteronomous determination - the power of the gods. Conversely
and paradoxically, even the god's identity is threatened. Alkmene needs
a finite image to venerate the otherwise abstractJupiter, and Jupiter fully
unveiled (the allusion to Schiller and Hardenberg is deliberate) would
destroy her. But sinceJupiter has assumed her husband's form, the god
ironically also becomes indiscernible - except through the exercise of
arbitrary power.
The great alternative of the age, aesthetic discourse, is given equally
short shrift. Grace, the foundational concept ofSchilJer's epoch-making
Kant critique, is cruelly deconsnucted in a late essay, Uber lias Atlario-
netlmthea/Q (1810, Or! lhe puppet-theatre). SchilJer had aestheticised Kant's
rigoristic ethics in Uber Anmut und Wiirde by his argument that only grace
can harmonise rationality ,vith corporeality and so square the circle of
human fulfilment and ethical perfection. Kleist's fictive dialogue coun-
ters ,vith a claim that the ultimate expression of grace is paradoxically
unattainable by humans. More graceful by far are the soulless, yet gravity-
defYing puppets dancing in the marketplace (Kleist perhaps has 'Der
Tanz' in mind), or the instinctive yet unerring parrying movements of
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the bear as he duels with a swordsman. Thus the problem is not the
body, but humanity's definitive feature: consciousness. Consciousness
is not only incapable of founding identity with certainty. It also mili-
tates fundamentally against the institution of aesthetic grace. Once a
beautiful youth recognises himself in the mirror ofreflective thought, his
aesthetic potential for mind-body harmony is lost. Only an infinite con-
sciousness, in which the dualism of the opposition is overcome, promises
restitution - in an intuition of the absolute, perhaps. But Kleist offers
no prospect of this. His novella Das Erdbeben in Chili (1807; The earthqUflke
in Chile) puts the fully politicised version of aesthetic education from the
Asthetische Erziehung to an equally deconsrructive literary test. The French
Revolution figures as the natural disaster. After its purging of the cor-
rupt and hierarchical order a rural idyll spontaneously emerges which
unmistakably represen ts the realised aesthetic state. When immediately
thereafter the practices of the former regime are re-instituted and the
aesthetic state destroyed, Kleist's verdict on Schiller is clear. That state
cannot last either, given the fundamental insecurity of things. Kleist may
well have derived this last notion from his friend Adam Miiller's philo-
sophical Lehre vom Gegensal<.e (1805; Theory ifopposition),;3 which argued
that successive states of thought and things are equally prompted by mo-
ments of negation. These generate ever-changing series of oppositional
states, without however ever moving through a truly dialectical synthe-
sis in the manner of Schelling - or Hegel. But Kleist doubtless relished
expressing this view in the literary language invented by Schiller.
Kleist apart, the fundamental tendencies of the early part of the
epoch obsel\'ed by Friedrich Schlegel were breaking up. When Napoleon
crushed the Prussian army at the battle ofJena-Auerstadt in 1806 and
the old Germany was occupied and then abolished by the imperialist
heir of the Revolution, the optimism and cosmopolitanism characteris-
tic ofboth literary and philosophical strands ofdevelopment in Germany
modulated into something more conservative and nationalistic. In phi-
losophy, one eA-pression of this is an intensified focus on society or na-
tion rather than the individual. Fichte's Reden an die deulsche Nation (1806;
Addresses 10 the Ger1Tl1ln nation) transposed the ethical mission of the
sovereign ego into the historical and cultural mission of the sovereign
German nation. In literature, Schiller's DieJungfrau von Orleans (1800; The
maid ifOrleans) had against the background of the Wars ofCoalition put
the tragedy ofJeanne d'Arc at the service of national regeneration, as
the heroine's moral conflict becomes an inspiring legend of missionary
self-sacrifice in the interest of a divided nation. Schiller's earlier solution
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to the political problem - aesthetic education proper - is represented
here in the coun of the ineffectual and irrelevant poet-king Rene. This
early appropriation of aesthetic humanism to propaganda was enthusi-
astically taken up by writers of the foUowing generation during the epoch
of the wars of liberation, 1806-15, and need concern us here no further.
These popularising developments with their strident compensatory
affirmations ofcoUective identity are however mirrored at a deeper level
by a more radical tendency to undermine the earlier generation's con-
fident theses in literature and philosophy. The later Romantic E. T A.
Hoffmann (1776-1822) probably heard Kant's lectures at university in
his native Konigsberg, and knew ScheUing's Naturphiwsophie. But like all
Romantics he engaged primarily as a poet with the received problems of
'Philosophie' and 'Poesie'. Decisively influenced by Karl Philipp Moritz's
empil;ca1 psychology of the 1780s, Hoffmann became fascinated by the
speculative Romantic psychology of Schuben, Johann Christian Reil
and Carl Alexander Ferdinand Kluge, which investigated abnormal and
psychopathological states of mind. In this tradition, Hoffmann's IEUllTe
radically questions the capacity for sovereignty ofself-consciousness and
seeks to validate unorthodox modes ofcognition. Hoffmann particularly
admired Schuben's Symbolik des Traumes (1814; The symbolism rfdream).54
This dcvelopment ofSchuben's theory in a sense renewed pre-modern
dream theory. Most dreams, says Schubert, are significant. The signifi-
cant ones represent a privileged state ofintuitive insight directly related to
the magnetic trance. Like the trance, like poetry and indeed nature itself,
they are unconscious products ofabsolUle creativity, of the 'hidden poet'
in us (Symbolik, 3), which impose themselves on the conscious mind and
possess the prophetic power ofthe primal language. Frequently they com-
ment ironically or morally on events in the subject'S prosaic waking life,
rather like conscience (which Hardenberg called the divine pan of our
being). But in our post-lapsarian state the primal language has undergone
the confusion ofBabel. The spiritual tendency ofdreams can be mistaken
and pervened into demonic temptation. Thus even at th.is, the highest
stratum of its intuitive power, the subject is constitutionally divided -
torn between temptation and the voice of conscience. Indeed, the per-
version of the poetic inner voice can become so powerful that it takes on
the concrete form of something already seen to good effect inJean Paul
and Kleist: the Doppelgiinger (66). This freshly destabilised version of the
Romantic subject, torn between higher self and evil double, is taken up
by Hoffmann in his first novel, the fictive autobiography Die Eli.xi£re des
Teufils (1814-15; The devil's elixirs), in order to comment on the Romantic
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tradition. As we have seen, the project to recover the transcendental self
had made autobiographical forms, from Hardenberg's Die Lehrlinge zu Sois
on, imo one of the favourite Classic-Romantic genres. Di£ Elixiere des
Te'!fels ostensibly continues this tradition. The monk Medardus, torn in
hi Schubertian way between spiritual and sensual tendencies, is at the
end ofhis advemurous life asked by the abbot to write his autobiography
for psychotherapeutic purposes. Having done so, Medardus should be
able to grasp his life's form and meaning and thus -like Hardenberg's ap-
prentice - hover in sovereign self-understanding above his contradictions.
In fact the te-xt dramatises its own failure. At a critical momem of moral
conflict catalysed by drinking a dubious elixir Medardus' Schubenian
Doppelgallger, the ruthless sensualist Vtktorin, is born. nconscious forces
,,~thin him compel him to take on iktorin's role. Thereafter he os-
cillates unpredictably and hean-rendingly between both roles. Various
form ofseJf-analysis - before the authorities of the law, the church, and
the new institution of (Reilian) clinical psychotherapy - all fail to heal
the intrinsic duplicity of Medardus' person. 0, unfortunately, does the
aesthetic autobiography. Sometimes the Doppelgallger seems a real and
concrete individual, sometimes a mere projection, sometimes he seems
to have died, ·yet again he re-surfaces, so that Viktorin's status as fact or
fiction remains agonisingly ambiguous. Worse, this figure from the past
colonises the identity of Medardus as he writes in the presem. This dis-
located perspective is shared by the reader. Die Elixiere des Teufils, then, is
not merely a literary version ofSchubert's theory. It is also a deconsrruc-
tive commentary ill the Romantic tradition 011 the Romantic tradition.
Both pillars ofauthority on which that tradition stands are undermined:
the recuperable autonomy of the subject and of the text as means to
thaI. Die Elixiere des Teufils also features a puppet-play - from Kleist to
Buchner always the signal for an attack on the aesthetic humanist tradi-
tion. But this time the target is not Schillerian grace. In the puppet-play of
David and Goliath,55 presemed by the novel's raisonneur, the artist-fool
Belcampo-Schonfe1d, Goliath figures \vith a disproportionate giant head
as the representative of consciousness, moral guardian and censor of the
animal in us - Mth predictable results. or dnes HolImann spare Nalur-
philosophie or magnetism. Die &rgwerke zu Falun (18t4; The miMs at Falun)
exploits another Schubertian moti[ In his Awhlen (21S() Schubert told
how (thanks to vitriolated water in the shaft) a young miner's body was
recovered perfectly preserved many decades after his disappearance -
to the shock of his aged \vife. Of this Hoffinann makes a response to
the Classic-Romantic Isis myth. The young miner Elis's disappearance
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is motivated by the desire to encounter the divine queen of nature, who
has conquered his young wife in his affections. The discovery of his
petrified body - preserved for ctemil)', yct lifeless - mockingly de-
constructs Hardenberg's understanding of the Isis myth. Hoffmann's
Maglletiseur (1814; The mesmerisQ exposes the magnetic rapport as merely
an exploitive power-relationship between the mesmerist and his sug-
gestible victim.
With Schubert, Kleist and Hoffmann, the high esteem ofphilosophers
and poets for aesthetic intuition as a panacea for the sovereign yet di-
vided Kantian subject passes its high point. Against this background,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), schooJfriend of Schelling
and Hblderlin, and Fichte's successor as Professor ofPhilosophy at Berlin
Universil)' in 1815, draws the sum of the epochal tendencies in both phi-
losophy and art. His synthesis is deeply critical of the spirit of the age,
and it set the terms of dialogue for the rest of the nineteenth century.
He shares many idealist and Romantic convictions. Indeed, in proposing
subjectivil)' as the primal and ultimate reality, he is more radical even than
Kant and the Romantics. In a work often regarded as the introduction to
his mature philosophy, the Plziillomellologi.e des Gei.s1£S (1807; Phenomenolngy
qfspirit),56 Hegel argues that subjectivil)' is identical with being or living
substance (23)' But this overarching subjectivil)' cannot be adequately
grasped in its most general or abstract form, in some such formulation
as 'the absolute'. Such an assertion is at best a beginning. To be ade-
quately grasped, the abstract concept must be understood as result, fully
and concretely realised. Hegel thus Qike Schelling) focuses on the process
of becoming from abstract to concrete - here eaUed phenomenology -
whereby the absolute unfolds itself by negation to fuU self-knowledge in
and through the particular concrete domains of realil)' - nature, history,
the state, art, religion and philosophy. But the way this is achieved ex-
poses a gulf between Hegel and Romanticism. If the Romantic commit-
ment to intuitionism is about anything, it is about overcoming division
and the consciousness of division. Yet Romanticism falls short of this,
the definitive modern aspiration. For intuition, its chosen mode of ex-
hibiting the mediation of the absolute, in fact merely perpetuates the
dualism it secks to overcome. In a weU-known passage (where Hegel
probably has Schellingian Naturphilnsophie or Hardenberg's aesthetic en-
cyclopaedism in mind), he notes caustieaUy that merely to confront the
absolute idea (true in itself, he does not doubt) with empirical material
with which it might be claimed to be identical, so that all is indiJIerent
in the absolute, amounts to empl)' formalism. This is not systematically
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mediated self-realisation of abstract concept and particularised reality
so much as capricious divinations ('EinfalJe') (21) and empty depth (17).
Famously deconstructing Hardenberg's central poetic metaphor for the
dark insight of intuition, Hegel concludes that this, so far as philosophy is
concerned, is the night in which all cows are black (22). His stark alterna-
tive is to redefine the cognitive potential and ontological status ofthought.
To exclude reAection from truth as they (and in a sense Kant) did is to
mistake the nature ofreason (25)' A formulation such as the absolute may
be true in itself('an sich'), but is nOl yet fully mediated with its otherness,
the sense in which the absolute in its otherness (being, particularised dif-
ference, reality) is a1sojOritself('ftir ich'). Subjectivity rethought is thus
nothing less than the dialectical movement of reAective thought through
this negation to the negation ofthe negation and full self-consciousness in and
jOr itself. This becoming - when fully thought through - is spirit, truly
systematic self-knowledge, philosophy. Hegel's epistemology thus con-
trasts strongly not only with Romantic intuitionism but also with Kant.
Kant had concluded that the ultimate reality of things in themselves was
b definition inacce sible 10 our faculty of thought, structured as it is by
the categories. Hegel points out that Kant often tran gresses his own
set epistemological boundaries: he seems 10 recogn.ise some cognitive
dignity in aesthetic ideas; and his claim that we cannot know things in
themselves paradoxically implies some kind of knowledge of them. For
Hegel, thought properly understood is the essence of intelligible being,
and thinking things through contradiction to reconciliation is itself the
di dosure of truth. There is no domain transcending thought.
This uncompromising advocacy of elf-transparent thought as the
sole adequate vehide of the pursuit of truth leads 10 a characteristic re-
evaluation of aesthetic cognition in Hegel's mature philosophy, which
(by contrast to the PhiiIwmmologie) works out the realisation of the idea
in world history. ature and the state are objective realisations of the
idea. But the self-knowledge of spirit must go beyond these particular
realisations and reAect the absolute as such, free, as Hegel says in his
Vorlesungen iiber du Asthetik (182o-g; wturcs on aestheti&s),5i ofthe straitening
confines of existence (XIll, 128-39). Hegel sees three vehicles of this, in
ascending order ofsophistication - art, religion and philosophy. In all of
them we experience not relative, but higher, substantial truth, in which
all contradictions are harmonised (XIIl, 137(), including, for e:'(ample, that
of spirit and nature. The way in which this epistemological hierarchy is
established follows the panern ofthe dialectic and the critique ofmodes of
cognition. They are distinguished only by form. Art presents knowledge
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of the absolute harmony and unity of spirit in an individual, sensual
and objective form, for intuition and feeling: the absolute idea, no Ie s,
in an adequate sensual marUfestation as a unity of form and content.
In this, Hegel seems for a moment to adopt the Romantic position. He
is however merely registering the temper of the Romantic age, only to
transcend it at once. For art is not the highest mode ofself-consciousness
for spirit. Its sensual mode of representing the absolute is art's own limit.
Spirit needs to know itself in a form adequate to its own inwardness, and
rejects the externality of art. And this is the case in Hegel's epoch, when
art has already achieved its maximum. In religion the absolute is known
in the more adequate, subjective and inward mode. But religion too has
its limit. Religious consciousness is characteristically emotionalised and
devotional, lacking in clarity. And this, ofcourse, is the work ofthe highest
mode ofspirit's self-knowledge, philosophy, which unifies thought, as the
highest form of objectivity, with religion's subjectivity.
Hegel thus recognises the dominance of Romanticism in his own
epoch of post-Goethean modernity, but only in order to condemn it. In
terms of art history, he distinguishes three modes of aesthetic expression
",jth.in the basic definition: the symbolic, the classical, and the Romantic.
The most primitive, the symbolic, is dominated by an undeveloped -
abstract - notion of the idea, which is held to be representable (Hegel is
thinking of Oriental cultures) by any natural creature. This leads to an
inevitable aesthetic tension between the symbol and the idea. In classi-
cal art, the idea has attained full understanding as concrete spirit or true
inwardness, for which the only adequate expression (Hegel is thinking of
Greece and Goethe) is the human form. In classical art, by contrast with
the symbolic, the idea is not embodied as the sensual reality of the hu-
man form; human form represents sensually the spiritual objectivity of
the idea. In this sense classical an is the fragile aesthetic ideal. Romantic
art, as always in Hegel, represents an unharmonious and passing synthe-
sis of self-knowledge. As characteristically inward, spirit at this level by
definition cannot be adequately eAllressed in art. Romantic art recog-
nises this. Intrinsically divided, it embodies the tension between true
inwardness and arry sensual representation, and - pointing to religion -
rejects the latter. This is meant to suggest that not only Romantic art,
but all art will pass away (at least in this function), and it leads Hegel to a
fierce critique of Romanticism (in the work of Friedrich Schlegel) which
for decades determined its prestige. Romanticism is egocentricity, intu-
itionism and frivolous irony. Fichte he presents as propounding the ability
of the self to create a disposable reality by an act of will. The Romantic
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artist is the aesthetic analogue of this, a genius creating his own aesthetic
disposable world which is lacking in fundamental earnesmess and open
to ironic destruction at any moment. As with the Schelling critique of
the Phiinomenologie, then, the Romantic aesthetic subject stops half-way,
cannot go beyond negativity to full mediation ",jth the real, and remains
trapped in the prison of the selfwhilst yearning helplessly to transcend it.
The ell:pression of the idea as irony thus dominates Romantic art. This
is neither Schlegel's weU-intentioned transcendental buffoonery nor the
truly comic, but a grotesque caricature of comedy, in which even what
is valuable in the aesthetic representation is v.iliully destroyed by irony,
valued as a principle for its own sake. This is mirrored by Hegel's in-
terpretations of Romantic literature. Drama, for example, is for Hegel
the genre capable of sho\ving beauty - the overcoming of conflict - in
its most profound development (XIll, 267). Kleist is thus attacked for the
lasting consciousness of div;sion in his dramas.58 Unsurprisingly, Hegel
condemns the Romantic fashion for 'magnetic' characters. This is the
symptom ofintrinsic di,,jsion. Kleist's Kathchen and Prince of Homburg
prefer the trance to clear thinking (xrv, 201 f.). They have no true char-
acter, being inhabited by a force which is yet other to them, and thus
faU prey to dark powers. In true art, by contrast, there should be noth-
ing dark, true characters should always be at rest in themselves, and
uch literature is the vapid, frivolous and empty product of a sickness
of mind. But the ironic character, constantJy turning into its opposite,
is the Romantic ideal (xJU, 314f.). And precisely this is the problem of
E. T. A. Hoffmann (xm, 289, 315).
Hegel's judgements are in general admirably irtformed, apt and per-
spicuous. Nonetheless it should be clear that Hegel's insistentJy har-
monistic standpoint makes him blind to Romantic literature's powerful
disclosure of the existential pathology and suffering of the divided mod-
ern person and of the pre- or unconscious strata whence they emerge;
Romantic irony is not as empty of content as Hegel suggests. More-
over history appears to disagree \vith Hegel's judgement on the end of
an, which has so far usurped religion's position in modern culture and
thus confirmed the Romantic rather than the Hegelian ,,jew of cultural
history.59 Far from dying, the tradition of self-consciously reflexive, ex-
perimental art inaugurated by Romanticism has established itself as the
basic form of modernist literature in our search for meaning, recognis-
ably extending through the traditional canon of micro-epochs to the
present. And Hegel's philosophical standpoint, his fundamental concept
of self-transparent, self-present thought, the crux of his chaUenge to the
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Schellingian and early Romantic philosophies of identity, has also failed
to establish a consensus in modern philosophy. Philosophers in the French
semiological tradition deny the capacity of thought to be self-present in
the system ofdifferential signifiers.60 Those in the Wittgensteinian tradi-
tion deny the possibility of a universal meta-language such as Hegelian
philosophical discourse. 6' Even those in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition
deny the capacity of philosophical dialectic to express the contradic-
tions of modern industrialised culture. &2 Most recently, those standing
between the continental and analytic traditions of philosophy reassert
the late Schellingian critique of Hegel - that the bare facts of existence
cannot be brought as such before thought, but require intuitive presen-
tation - as the inauguration of the existential tradition and a revalidation
of self-ironising Romantic discourse63 Thus the Romantic tradition in
both art and philosophy has - so far - outlived Hegel.
Goethe's Faust (1808-32), in a sense, is the prime instance of this. Faust
is the ultimate divided Romantic hero, who instantiates in literature
precisely the figure of thought set out by Hegel in the preface of the
Phiinomenologie. Emblematically imprisoned in his narrow, high-ceilinged
Gothic study, he rejects metaphysics but yearns to re-establish the con-
nection between his person and the life of the universe. Until now, the
university has been the vehicle of that ambition. But its characteristi-
cally abstract form of scholarship is no match for his inner desire. Ex-
perimental physics will not raise the veil of nature. He has exhausted
the knowledge inventory of all four contemporary faculties (theology,
medicine, law, and alas philosophy too). Faust's turn to an alternative
form of knowledge both esoteric and intuitionist thus mirrors the trend
of the age. Yet Goethe presents this with critical distance. The sign of the
macrocosm, with its intoxicating spectacle of living, inteIWoven totality
and individuality, promises all, but remains mere spectacle - doubtless
a verdict on the vulgar Romantic tradition. And Faust's project is di-
mirtished still further through his subsequent rejection by the lower, but
no less transcendent 'Erdgeist' (spirit of the earth). Reduced to the typi-
cally modern state of an absurd acceptance ofexistence without mean-
ing (except that which he himself can bestow), Faust finally receives in
Mephistopheles not so much a devil as a principle of negation. What
follows, then, is the epic dramatisation of the modern subject'S search
for meaning in the age for which the absolute is present only as negation.
Faust continues to value the spontaneity and immediacy ofintuitive expe-
rience. But he equates that neither with poetry (HA III, 59; lines 1788ff.)
nor with absolute knowledge (HA III, 149; line 4727). One particular
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interest of the work is to set that drama in a moral framework - this is
the point of the devil's presence in a post-Christian work. But another is
its representativeness. This is why Faust seeks to encompass in his person
(in both parts of the drama) nothing less than the sum of human ex-
perience. In this ambition, Faust, for all its anti-Romantic tendencies, is
something like the counterpart to Hegelian philosophy in aesthetic form.
Thus if the domestic tragedy of Gretchen in part one of the drama
represents the first opening of Faust's divided and desiccated psyche to
the transforming (if not yet redemptive) power of love, part two vastJy
widens the tragic compass. Gretchen turns out (for the moment) merely
to have prefigured the true object ofFaust's Romantic yearning: Helena,
ideal ofclassical beauty. Goethe uses Faust's romance with Helena, whom
he first conjures as an aesthetic illusion but then really encounters, as
a structure through which to reflect poetically on the deepest tenden-
cies of the age and indeed of occidental cultural history - perhaps the
highest fulfilment of the literary side ofScWegel's dictum of1798. These
include republican and monarchic forms of government: the site of the
encounter with Helen, centre of part two, is the banks of the upper
Peneios, scene of the battle between imperial Caesar and republican
Pompey. But they also include reflections on the dominant contempo-
rary theories of the genesis oflife on earth (Vulcanism and Neprunism in
the persons of Anaxagoras and Thales), and even a harsh, aesthetically
founded critique of the introduction of paper money to fund war (an
allusion to the trend-setting assignats of the French Revolution). There is
another swipe at Fichteanism. The theme invested with most significance
is, however, the great cultural division of the epoch: the confrontation
of classicism and Romanticism, antiquity and modernity, in Helena and
Faust. But the fate oftheir child, Euphorion, gives Goethe's verdict. Based
on Byron, Euphorion is the very incarnation ofpoetry, love and freedom
(including political freedom). But Icarus-like he kills himself, through im-
patience. Helena's fate asfemnufawk is confirmed. As the combination
of beauty and happiness proves too unstable, she chooses to return to
the realm of the shades - memory. Faust continues as he must to strug-
gle, and the drama now incorporates great themes - the technological
mastery of nature and colonialism - which concern modernity to this
day. Yet tragic resignation, programmed into it by the negativity of the
pact with the devil, haunts the rest of the text. Faust's modernistic assent
to life involves the acceptance of existential restlessness, whereby fulfil-
ment - the intuition of the beautiful moment - would also entail death.
When Faust appears for a moment to be satisfied in contemplation of
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hi deeds, J'vIephistopheles closes Lhe crap, but he is confuted by a re-
deemer God on a point of interpretation. But even this is not Lhe end
for Faust, who, it is suggested, will now progress to higher spheres of
being under Gretchen's tutelage. Even after Helena, then, he remains a
fragment, po essed by Lhe memory ofwholeness, unendingly in pursuit
of perfection.
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